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Abstract
I identify a discriminatory bias in partnership formation within the property crime mar-
ket in the United States. Theoretically, the prisoner's dilemma creates an incentive for a
criminal to form a partnership with a counterpart with the same probability of success, re-
sulting in an equilibrium pattern of positive assortative matching. Using individual matched
report-arrest data from the National Incident Based Reporting System and a novel empiri-
cal strategy, I pinpoint matches where the underlying probability of success of two partners
diﬀer. This diﬀerence in probability is correlated with observable characteristics, which
could be evidence for discrimination and search frictions. I ﬁnd patterns consistent with
discrimination in male-female partnerships and patterns consistent with search frictions in
black-white matches. In particular, females in a male-female partnership are more likely to
evade law-enforcement than males, even though on average males are more successful as a
group. This results is robust to controlling for the criminal earnings, individual criminal
oﬀenses and market characteristics. Furthermore, these patterns are found also in criminal
groups of a size bigger than 2. The result could be either due to pre-crime marital matching
or discrimination.
Keywords: Organized Crime, Assortative Matching, Discrimination
JEL Codes: K42, J16, J71, C78
1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that females on average earn less than males. In OECD countries, for
the year 2010, females earned 77 percent of what males did. The ﬂip side of this fact is that for
the same wage, females have higher levels of observable human capital than males. If the gender
wage gap is at least in part attributable to discrimination, then this bias should be found in all
labour markets, especially those that face very little regulation, like the market for criminals.
Generally, the gap has been attributed to a mix of three factors: ﬁrst, females could be less
productive than males. Second, search frictions could lead to ineﬃcient matching and, third,
discrimination. The identiﬁcation of whether the gender wage gap results from discriminatory
bias has been challenged by lack of good data on each side of the employer-employee match.
Yet, matches in the crime market yield an additional individual outcome - which perpetrator
∗Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, 5045
Bergen, Norway. e-mail: evelina.gavrilova@nhh.no. I am grateful to Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Floris Zoutman,
VikramMaheshri, Sander Renes, Aart Gerritsen and Steﬀen Juranek for thorough comments. I also thank seminar
participants at the University of Essex, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Norwegian School of Economics. This
paper has been also presented at the Lyon-Turin Doctoral workshop and the 5th Transatlantic Workshop on the
Economics of Crime. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
got arrested. Thus, if discrimination is a pervasive social phenomenon, and if it can be found in
the market for criminals, then new data can solve the identiﬁcation problem of discrimination
and shed a light on its eﬀect in the market for workers.
This paper is the ﬁrst to link the literature on assortative matching with that on crime
and discrimination. Until now the economic literature on crime has focused on single oﬀenders
(Becker, 1968) and big organized groups. This paper is also the ﬁrst to consider the building
of a small group, applying the theory of assortative matching to small criminal enterprises.
While discrimination in the presence of assortative matching has been explored in the context
of employer-employee matches (see for e.g. Bartolucci, 2014), it has remained understudied in
other matching markets with incentives for positive assortative mating.
In this paper I analyze the market for criminal partners through the lens of assortative
matching. When a criminal chooses a partner with whom to commit a crime, he knows that
in order to avoid a, literal, prisoner's dilemma he has to pick a counterpart who would be able
to evade law-enforcement. When each criminal wants a partner with high ability of not getting
arrested, this results in an equilibrium outcome of positive assortative matching, where part-
ners have similar probabilities to evade the police (Becker, 1973). Positive assortative matching
means that the probability of success between two partners are positively correlated. In equi-
librium one can observe matches between two criminals with high probability of success and
between criminals with low probability of success, but no matches where one partner has a high
probability of success and the other has a low probability of success.
Given endogenous positive assortative matching, the diﬀerence in unobservable criminal pro-
ductivity between the two partners would be zero. As this diﬀerence is zero, it should not be
correlated to diﬀerences in observed characteristics. If diﬀerences in arrest outcomes (where
arrest is a measure for criminal productivity) are correlated with diﬀerences in observables, then
this indicates either the presence of discriminatory bias or search frictions. That is, the prisoner's
dilemma incentive sets the counterfactual diﬀerence in productivity to zero, thus any observed
diﬀerence could be attributed to frictions or bias1. To clarify the empirical intuition consider
the following example: in a frictionless market, if a male indulges a discriminatory bias towards
females, he would require a skill premium to match with her and she would match with him if
she has a positive bias for males. Thus, he would match up and he would be compensated for
his bias with the diﬀerence in probability of success. Once the crime is commited, it is likely
that he will get arrested and she not, thus the diﬀerence in observed probability of success would
be correlated to the source of bias - gender. Additionally, in biased matches the diﬀerence in
productivity is diﬀerent from zero.
However, if the environment is not frictionless, the diﬀerence in criminal productivity between
the two partners would not be zero. Then, in the extreme case partners would match randomly
with the ﬁrst arriving candidate and the diﬀerence in productivity between them would be equal
to the diﬀerence in average productivity between the two demographic groups whose members
form a partnership.
Empirically, if only one partner gets arrested, then there could be a productivity diﬀerence
between the partners. If this success diﬀerence turns out to be systematically correlated with
observables, then there is a bias or frictions in matching. The only way to distinguish between
biased matching and frictions is by taking into account the average probability of success of
the demographic groups, whose members commit to a partnership. Whenever the diﬀerence
in criminal ability between partners has an opposite sign to the diﬀerence induced by random
matching, then this would be evidence of discriminatory bias.
For the purpose of identifying a bias I use over one million individual observations on criminal
partnerships in property crime from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) in
the period 1995-2011. By matching crime reports to arrests, I deﬁne the probability of success as
1One can think of discrimination as a bargaining friction, but in this paper it will be considered separate from
all other frictions.
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the probability of not being arrested. This probability reveals information about the criminal's
law-evasion skills, namely whether the criminal is good at evading the police or not. This
measure already discounts information from preferential treatment from the police for a certain
demographic group, if such treatment exists (see for e.g. Persico & Todd, 2006) and it is a
relevant measure of productivity about which criminals care. Only the outcome is observed by
the econometrician, while the real probability may be observed by the partner in crime.
By modeling criminal partnerships in this way, I ﬁnd that in black-white partnership, white
criminals turn out to face a lower probability of success unconditionally and conditionally, both
as a demographic group and as partners of successful blacks. These diﬀerences in probability are
consistent both with bias and search frictions. When considering gender, unconditionally males
are more successful than females. However, in male-female partnerships the females are more
successful than the males. Therefore, females match with less productive males. Equivalently,
from the perspective of the males, they match with females with higher probability of success
than their own. This pattern could be due to search frictions but it is more consistent with a
discriminatory bias.
The bias in male-female matches could have diﬀerent sources. From all probable sources
of bias, several can be rejected right away. First, females might be assigned the safer role in
the commission of the crime because of gender stereotypes, and thus they have a higher success
probability conditional on the match. In a robustness check I show evidence that the bias still
holds when accounting for the type of crime commited. Second, if there is an unfavourable sex-
ratio so that the underrepresented group could have a bargaining advantage (like when marrying
up, see for example Becker, 1973; Abramitzky et al., 2011). However, matches in the criminal
market are not constrained to consist of a male and female (unlike in the traditional marriage
market), therefore, matching should not be inﬂuenced by the sex ratio. Furthermore, in a
robustness check I take subsamples of criminal markets with diﬀerent sex and race ratios and
the results remain robust. Third, reporting biases related to crimes could be creating spurious
correlations. However, when I control for measurement errors by taking a subsample with only
arrested couples and a subsample of daylight crimes, results remain robust. Fourth, controlling
for the monetary value of the property stolen and taking into account gang membership does
not change the results. Finally, in a falsiﬁcation exercise on criminal groups of three I show that
the same result holds.
There are two explanations, alternative to discriminatory bias, for the result I obtain. First,
the bias could be due to reputation, where females have a worse reputation than males, so
that they have to compensate for it with higher criminal ability. This is consistent with an
early suggestion by Steﬀensmeier (1980), who notes that males are less likely to choose to
commit a crime with a female because females are deemed to be governed by passions and,
thus, they are not trustworthy. Second, arrest diﬀerences could be the consequence of pre-crime
matching. Male-female matches are more likely to be the result of marriage market matches,
where male scarcity can lead females to date down and this would be apparent in the criminal
market. A caveat of this explanation is that several studies ﬁnd that marriage partners in the US
increasingly match assortatively with respect to earnings, academic achievement and intelligence
(see for e.g. Bredemeier & Juessen, 2013).
This empirical test could be applied to a diverse set of matching markets if there were no
data limitation. For example, academic co-authorships are also formed along the incentive to
pair up with a partner, who is better at publishing articles, generating a similar pattern of
positive assortative matching. However, in that setting only the match speciﬁc outcome of
publishing is known and not the individual productivity. While the underlying populations
in academia and crime diﬀer in many characteristics, if this type of gender discrimination is
pervasive across spheres of society, it implies that females in male-female co-authorships could be
more productive than males. This test cannot be applied to marital mating, despite the similar
matching incentive, because these matches are constrained to consist of a male and female,
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thus the quest for gender bias is superﬂuous. The preference for own race has already been
documented in online dating by Hitsch et al. (2010) and caste (as a similar salient categorical
characteristic) by Banerjee et al. (2013). Similarly, this test cannot be applied to the labour
market because productivity diﬀerences between the employer and employee are not zero, for
example due to hierarchy and experience. Yet, if discrimination is a social condition, ﬁnding
evidence of it in the unregulated crime markets points to its existence in other spheres of society,
among which the named academic and labour ones.
Considering implication for law-enforcement, it is notable that I ﬁnd evidence of persistent
search frictions in matching between whites and blacks. If this can be traced back to taste
discriminating bias, this means that one can hinder the exchange of criminal capital between
prison cell-mates if they are of diﬀerent race. However, whether this is ultimately the case would
have to be accessed by future research.
In this paper, by the virtue of arrest data, I link matching to a productivity measure, thus
detecting discrimination. There are two sides to the literature on assortative matching. From the
theoretical perspective, Becker (1973) has applied the concept of positive assortative matching to
marital pairing in which there is positive correlation between the abilities of two spouses. Shimer
& Smith (2003) introduce frictions in the matching market and deﬁne additional conditions in
which assortative matching holds2. From the empirical side, Abramitzky et al. (2011) and
Angrist (2002) consider the eﬀect of sex ratios on assortative mating. Theoretically, as long
as matches are constrained to consist of a male and a female, an unbalanced sex ratio endows
one gender with an advantage in securing a better partner with respect to an environment with
a balanced sex ratio. But a marriage is not like a criminal partnership (although individual
opinions may diﬀer). The crime market is characterized by unbalanced sex and race ratios,
however, matches are not constrained in composition. Therefore, not one demographic group
has explicit bargaining power and this allows me to identify a bias.
Empirically, I take the diﬀerence in the criminal skill measure of partners in order to de-
termine the pattern of matching, rather than looking at correlations between traits, as do for
example Pencavel (1998) and Rose (2007), and I take the analysis a step further into the realm
of discrimination. Lang & Lehmann (2012) provide an up-to-date discussion of the literature
on discrimination. Looking for evidence of frictions and discrimination in this reduced-form
approach, contrasts with structural models on search in the labour market (such as Bartolucci,
2014; Flabbi, 2010). While structural assumptions relax data requirements, the crime market
oﬀers the individual speciﬁc productivity measure of arrest which allows me to pinpoint the
presence of a bias intuitively.
While the notions of assortative matching and similarity in observables(preference-for-same)
are used interchangeably in some contexts such as network theory, here they can be treated
separately. Many studies have identiﬁed the preference for same. Bagues & Perez-Villadoniga
(2012) show in a natural experiment that recruiters prefer applicants who have similar to their
own set of skills. Arcand & Fafchamps (2012) demonstrate assortative matching in social traits
like ethnic proximity and wealth between members in community-based organizations in devel-
oping countries. In the setting of the crime market, I can disentangle matching on productivity
from matching on observables, aka discrimination.
Finally, this paper is related to the economic literature on crime. Starting with Becker
(1968), research has addressed individual decision making and aggregate relationships, however,
not in the context of co-oﬀending. The latter matter is missing in the recent literature review by
Levitt & Miles (2007). The criminological literature has given more attention to the organization
of small crimes and Alarid et al. (2009) provide evidence from prison interviews that oﬀenders
choose to commit a crime with a friend (from the same social circle) resolving issues of trust by
matching along social ties. Van Mastrigt & Carrington (2013) provides a review on the literature
from the perspective of network homophily (similarity in observables) in group oﬀending, noting
2Smith (2011) reviews this literature.
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that there is an incentive to select a successful partner, however stopping short at selecting
him from the local oﬀender pool and not considering the implications of this incentive, as it is
done in this paper. A further related novelty of this paper is that it ﬁnds evidence of a gender
bias in the crime market. In a similar vein, Gavrilova & Campaniello (2013) ﬁnd that in the
crime market females earn on average the same as males do, but they face a higher likelihood of
arrest, documenting a gender arrest and participation gap and opening the ﬁeld for investigating
discrimination in the crime market.
The structure of the paper is the following. First, in section 2, I present the data and some
preliminary results. Section 3 describes a simple static matching model that will aid the intuition
with the identiﬁcation strategy and interpretation. In sections 4 I discuss the empirical strategy.
In sections 5 and 6 I turn to results and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
The source of criminal data for this paper is the National Incident Based Reporting System
(NIBRS), covering criminal incidents in the United States. The sample period runs from 1995
to 2011. NIBRS consists of repeated cross-sections, where the data points are individual level
records on crime incidents submitted by law enforcement agencies. These records provides details
on how many perpetrators were involved in one incident, their demographic characteristics (such
as age, gender and race) and the characteristics of the crime. For example an armed robbery
is commited by 2 white males at a liquor store. The victim (or witnesses) would report to
the police the time of the crime, how much was stolen and what the oﬀenders look like. Both
oﬀenders would be recorded with a robbery Uniform Crime Report (UCR) code and one (or
both) of them would be recorded as using a weapon. When the police arrests one of the robbers
it will note in the incident ﬁle that there has been one arrest and it would link the arrest incident
to the robbery incident. This example spells out the advantages of the NIBRS over other crime
data. It provides individual crime reports rather than yearly totals, demographic characteristics
of perpetrators, arrest outcomes for each criminal, the nature and characteristics of the crime.
The main caveat of the NIBRS data is that it is not representative for the US. In the beginning
of the sample period, in 1995, 290 agencies from 9 states submitted data, while in 2011, 1908
agencies from 36 states did so. The NIBRS is representative for crimes in the jurisdictions of
smaller and medium-sized agencies. Given that submitting individual crime reports is a costly
activity, there are a few big agencies that submit data. In a given county there exist from 1
to 36 reporting agencies, depending on population size and historical factors. Given that one
city can be overseen by several law-enforcement agencies, which could have a traditional focus
on neighborhoods or types of crime, it is likely that outcomes within an agency's jurisdiction
are correlated. Therefore, in the main analysis I cluster the errors on the agency variable and
provide a robustness check with city clustering. Despite this caveat, it is important to note that
inference in this paper is drawn on the universe of the reported property crime in the agencies
that submit reports.
There are three main reasons for which I concentrate my analysis on property crimes. First,
males have a natural advantage in perpetrating assault and similar crimes because of the direct
contact with the victim. However, property crimes have the aim of appropriating money or
property with no threat of force against the victims, therefore oﬀending is relatively independent
of diverse physical endowments between genders. Second, the property crime rate for 2011 was
estimated at 2,905 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants (UCR 2012). This is roughly 7 times more
that the violent crime rate. Third, the data oﬀers the opportunity to observe over what prospect
of criminal earnings did two oﬀenders match.
According to the Uniform Crime Reports, the following crimes are deﬁned as property ones
(UCR codes in parenthesis): arson3(200), robbery (120), burglary (220), larceny oﬀenses such
3Arson is an intentional damage of property through the setting of ﬁre. The usual motive is insurance fraud
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as pocket-picking (23A), purse-snatching (23B), shoplifting (23C), theft from building4 (23D),
theft from coin operated devices5 (23E), theft from car 6 (23F), theft of motor-vehicle parts
(23G), all other larceny (23H), motor vehicle theft (240) and selling of stolen property (280).
The NIBRS data is composed of several data sets. For this study I utilize the datasets on
oﬀender reports, property crimes and arrests. I select all property crimes commited in a 2 person
partnership with the following procedure: for a given year, I exclude agencies that do not submit
reports for the whole year. I merge the incident reports with the property data. To the resulting
dataset I merge the arrest data, using as a key the incident number, the race and gender of the
oﬀender. This allows me to analyze all the available information on a certain type of crime.
When ﬁltering the observations, dropping individuals for which all the characteristics of gender
and race are unknown, leaves me with 98 percent of the initial partnership data7. I select prime
age perpetrators between 15 and 65 years of age, which leaves 78 percent of the initial data8. I
concentrate my analysis on black and white criminals, but I provide robustness checks with the
other races in the sample.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for criminal partners. The average criminal is 26
years old. 65 percent of all criminals are white (caucasian and hispanic), 31 percent are female.
60 percent of all criminals succeed in evading law-enforcement, or equivalently, 40 percent get
arrested. Criminal markets on average are diverse and thus no demographic group holds a
speciﬁc advantage in numbers. 9. The mean criminal earnings are 1,113 USD. Oﬀenders from
Indian and Asian origin are in total 1 percent of the sample. Most oﬀenses are observed in
shoplifting, followed by all other larcenies and burglaries. In total there are 2, 174, 742 individual
observations, yielding 1, 087, 371 observed partnerships over the sample period.
In Table 2 I present the cross-tabulation of pairs. The ﬁrst column shows the total frequency
of the 4 types: black males, black females, white males and white females. The second column
denotes the success rates for each type. The remaining columns in table 2 show how often does a
category of criminal, for example white male, choose a criminal in the other category. Note that
black males emerge as the most successful and white females as the least successful criminals10.
78% of the black males pair up with other black males, followed by black females. Black females
choose one another in 63% of the cases. White males choose other whites in 95% of the cases,
of which 73 percentage points are other white males. White females have a similar preference
for other whites, but 51% of them also choose their own gender. Cross-race matches occur on
average in 8% of the cases for each type of criminal. On average, each type is observed to prefer
his own type as a partner.
In Table 2 it is observed that on average criminals prefer partners of their own type. Black
males form a match with other black males in 78 percent of the observed matches, white males
match between themselves in 73 percent of the matches. Black and white females do so re-
spectively in 63 percent and 51 percent of the matches. 10 percent of the black males match
with black females, while 21 percent of the white males commit crimes with white females.
or vandalism.
4The precise deﬁnition is: A theft from within a building that is open to the general public and where the
oﬀender has legal access. Taken from the Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook.
5Theft from coin-operated devices are classiﬁed as such when, for example, a cigarette vending machine is
riﬂed for money and/or merchandise.
6For example, a car is broken into and an umbrella is stolen.
7Selecting the couples already leaves out crimes in which the oﬀenders were not observed.
8These 20 percent of dropped observation are either on young oﬀenders, too old one or oﬀenders whose age is
unknown.
9The variable diversity denotes the average diversity of demographic characteristics of criminals within
the jurisdiction of an agency. This variable is the product of the fractions of females, males, whites
and blacks, normalized by the maximum the product can obtain, so that it varies between 0 and 1:
Diversity= females∗males∗whites∗blacks
0.54
. It would attain a value of 0 if a given market is homogeneous in the
type of criminals and as the heterogeneity increases so does diversity.
10This ordering holds also in individual crimes, where black males succeed in 73 percent of the crimes, white
males in 63 percent, black females with 59 percent and white females with 55 percent.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
White 0.655 0.476 0 1
Asian 0.006 0.076 0 1
Indian 0.007 0.084 0 1
Female 0.309 0.462 0 1
Age 25.724 9.929 15 65
Success 0.593 0.491 0 1
Diversity 0.398 0.341 0 1
Earnings 1113.213 3129.035 0 86970
Arson 0.005 0.069 0 1
Pocket-picking 0.002 0.044 0 1
Purse-snatching 0.003 0.055 0 1
Shoplifting 0.278 0.448 0 1
Theft from Building 0.073 0.260 0 1
Theft from Coin-Operated Machine 0.003 0.052 0 1
Theft from Motor Vehicle 0.057 0.233 0 1
Parts 0.013 0.113 0 1
All Other Larceny 0.182 0.386 0 1
Motor Vehicle Theft 0.049 0.216 0 1
Burglary 0.153 0.360 0 1
Robbery 0.102 0.302 0 1
Stolen Property Oﬀenses 0.017 0.130 0 1
Observations Sample: 2 174 742 Total: 2 215 362
Notes: An observation is a criminal in a crime committed in jurisdiction of an agency in certain date and hour.
The success rate is the complement to the arrest rate. Each criminal has one or more oﬀenses on his record for
the crime reported. Diversity takes a value 0 whenever in a given year-agency cell the market is restricted to only
whites, only blacks, only females or only males. The total sample consists of 2 215 362 individual observations.
The estimation sample excludes Asians and Indians (a robustness check is provided) and it consists of 2 174 742
individual observations.
Table 2: Cross Tabulation of Pairs
Total Success Black Males Black Females White Males White Females
Black Males 0.251 0.708 0.777 0.097 0.085 0.041
Black Females 0.087 0.513 0.281 0.629 0.026 0.064
White Males 0.441 0.590 0.049 0.005 0.733 0.213
White Females 0.222 0.506 0.046 0.024 0.423 0.506
Notes: An observation is a criminal partner in a crime committed in jurisdiction of an agency. The last four
values for each row sum to 1.
Table 3: Tabulation of the Probabilities of Success
Unconditional Conditional on Own Group Conditional on Other Group
Females 0.506 0.416 0.630
Males 0.633 0.635 0.624
Blacks 0.657 0.662 0.618
Whites 0.562 0.559 0.614
Notes: The ﬁrst column of numbers denotes the unconditional probability of success of a given demographic
group. The second column denotes the probability of success, conditional on forming a match with a member of
the same demographic group. The third column presents the same ﬁgure, conditional on a match with a member
for the other demographic group: for females it is males and vice versa, for whites it is blacks and vice versa.
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Obviously, the choice for a matching partner is not random. For example, if black males were
selecting partners randomly, then they would choose white males in more cases (44 percent)
than the 8.5 percent they do it.
In Table 3, the diﬀerence in conditional probabilities of success is tabulated. From it, one
can observe that females matching with males have a higher probability of success than the ones
matching with other females. Males face conditionally and unconditionally similar probabilities
across all three columns, while whites that match with blacks face a higher probability of success
than whites that match with other whites. Similarly, blacks matching with whites have a lower
probability of success than those that match with other blacks. Yet, matches between groups
seem to be between criminals with similar probability of success.
Thus, criminals do not match randomly and they have an explicit tendency to match with
a partner with the same demographic characteristics (that is, black males match with only
black males). The preference for same partner could be due to three reasons. First, successful
partners could be able to ﬁnd other successful counterparts only in their own demographic
group. This could be the case of black males, whose probability of success is highest and it is
less likely to be matched by white females. This implies that criminal success is non-randomly
distributed with respect to demographic groups. Yet, in table 3 one can see that whenever
black form a match with whites their probabilities of success are similar (last two rows, last
column). Thus, the distribution of the probability of success is at least overlapping between
the diﬀerent groups. Second, search frictions might preclude the matching between successful
partners from diﬀerent demographic group. For example residential segregation could lead to
successful whites not meeting their best black counterpart and thus picking the second best from
their own demographic group. Third, the preference for same partner could be due to an explicit
bias against matching with a diﬀerent demographic group. Thus, the ﬁgures in Table 2 could be
due to any and/or a mix of these 3 reasons. The next section will add the complexity of a toy
model in order to illuminate how the eﬀect of bias could be identiﬁed among all these possible
explanations.
3 Model
In this section I introduce a simple model of assortative matching, which demonstrates the
analytical framework for the empirical strategy in the next section. The aim of this application
of assortative matching is to arrive at a test for discrimination.
3.1 Frictionless Matching
When a suitable crime opportunity presents itself, a criminal has to choose a partner with whom
to exploit it. A partner might be required for a variety of motives, for example, complementarity
in skills, mentorship or courage. While motives diﬀer in the individual case, policing technology
provides a strong incentive for the type of matching. Given the practice of oﬀering a plea bargain
to the criminal partner arrested ﬁrst, each criminal associate faces the incentive to pair up with
the most successful possible counterpart. Considering the prospects oﬀered by the prisoner's
dilemma, in this classical setting, each criminal would prefer a partner who would not get
arrested. Considering the incentive for a successful associate from both sides of the partnership,
it seems straightforward that there should be positive correlation between criminal ability traits
between partners, that is, positive assortative matching on probability of arrest.
Introducing the criminals, assume that there is a unit continuum of them, each indexed by a
probability of success p ∈ [0, 1]. p is strictly increasing in criminal ability, that is, criminals with
a high p are more likely to evade law-enforcement than criminals with a low p. It is important
to note the role of policing technology. If law-enforcement were to put systematically more
eﬀort into catching criminals of one demographic group than of another group, then this would
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be ultimately reﬂected in their respective probability of success and this is what matter to the
matching partner.
Consider a frictionless market and assume that a criminal observes the probability of success
of his partners. In practice, communication between criminals is tricky as it bears risks: talking
about an illegal activity with an undercover agent, having witnesses, deciding whom to meet in
person. Information and meeting frictions are discussed in the last subsection. Thus, a match
emerges only if both parties judge one another to be trustworthy. In this model the easiest way
to trust a partner is by making sure he doesn't get arrested.
Assume that criminals are conscious that they are playing a two stage game. In the ﬁrst
stage they choose a partner. After that the probability of success is realized and in the second
stage, if at least one partner is arrested, they play a prisoner's dilemma. The second stage has
been extensively analyzed in economics, and the dominating strategy for both partners is to
cooperate with the prosecutor and spill the beans on the other. However, if none of the two
partners is captured, the game ends. Solving backwards, it seems best for a criminal to select
a partner who is less likely to get arrested, underpinning the incentive for positive assortative
matching.
In the following expected utility representation, I model the ﬁrst stage of the game. Without
loss of generality, assume that criminals are ordered as 1 and 2 in a partnership. For simplicity,
criminals commit crimes with partners and if they don't ﬁnd a partner they prefer to work in
the legal sector with wage W . A criminal with probability of success p1 maximizes his expected
utility with respect to his partner's success probability p2.
If criminal 1 gets arrested he gets a disutility D1 > 0. If he does not get arrested he will get
the exogeneous11 individual return Y ≥ 0. In the special case when his partner gets arrested he
will get the same return because they would have already parted and shared the loot, but he
will also incur the disutility D2 > 0 for the fact that his partner was arrested
12. The parameters
D1, D2 and Y are assumed to be crime-speciﬁc and do not vary systematically with respect
to diﬀerent probable partners. For example if a criminal decides to rob a bank he knows that
he would earn a certain amount no matter the partner and because of the crime he would face
a disutility if his partner gets caught. Additionally, one can think of D2 coming from a ﬁxed
criminal role, for which cooperation is required. This is most easily seen in the example of an
armed robbery, where one partner holds the weapon and the role of the other is to be an escape
driver. In this example, any other potential partner can be an escape driver and his arrest would
have similar implications on the probability of success of the robber. Still, a driver with a low
probability of arrest is more desirable than a driver with a high probability of arrest. Thus, the
expected utility is of the following kind:
EU(p2) = p1p2Y + p1(1− p2)(Y −D2) + (1)
p2(1− p1)(−D1) + (1− p2)(1− p1)(−D1) > W
The expected utility is increasing in the probability of success of the partner, ensuring a
preference for the most successful partner (∂EU
∂p2
= p1D2). That is, the higher the criminal
probability of success of the choosing criminal, the higher is the marginal utility from a match
with a better partner. Given the same preference for the partner, mutual acceptance of matches
ensures that each criminal will pair up with one of similar probability of success in equilibrium.
To see that p1 = p2 is an equilibrium outcome, assume that all criminals have a reservation
criminal probability of success of p1, equal to their own probability of success (only probability
11The exogeneity of income assumption is supported by criminological evidence that property crimes are often
opportunity based, rather than carefully planned. See for example Alarid et al. (2009).
12Setting D2 = Y (1 − α) would relax the behavioral conditional independence assumption, where α is the
additional probability of success in case the partner gets arrested, whose realization occurs after the matching
choice has been completed, in the second stage of the game.
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from now on). First, if 1 criminal deviates and lowers his reservation probability, that is, he
accepts a partner that has a lower probability than him p2 < p1, then he would be worse oﬀ
compared to a match with a partner of his same probability level. Second, if he would consider
a partner with p2 > p1, he would be rejected, because everybody else has the strategy to match
with a partner of their own probability. Third, if all criminals have a lower reservation probability
than their own, then one can deviate proﬁtably by matching up with a higher probability
criminal. Fourth, if all criminals have a higher reservation probability, then nobody would
agree to a match (except among pi = 1) because the possible counterpart with p
2 > p1 would
want to match with someone of even higher probability p3 > p2 > p1. Therefore, matching with
a partner of the same probability is a Nash equilibrium (as similarly shown by Becker, 1973).
Thus, in frictionless markets positive assortative matching would imply that
p1 − p2 = 0
3.2 Bias
In order to analyze the issue of a bias, assume that there areM demographic groups of criminals,
diﬀering from one another in demographic characteristics (for example three groups can be black
males, black females and white females). Given that a match is composed of 2 criminals, I will
consider equilibrium outcomes between group m and n. The ﬁrst criminal (in a match) from
group m has a probability of success p1m, while the second criminal has a probability of success
p2n.
The matching pattern in the market for criminals can be described through ﬁgure 1. Let the
individual criminal ability pm be distributed with mean pm and ﬁnite variance δm, with support
between 0 and 113. In this way, within each m and n group there is a heterogeneity of ability.
Consider the matches between 2 groups, m and n, and assume that pm > pn. In equilibrium, at
the individual level the diﬀerence in ability between partners would be 0. If the distributions of
ability of criminals of groups m and n are coinciding along an interval, as in ﬁgure 1, then there
could be matches between the 2 groups. This is demonstrated in the gray interval in the ﬁgure,
in which p1m = p
2
n. In this case, if criminal 1 from group m draws a relative low probability with
respect to his own group and criminal 2 from group n draws a relative high ability, then they
can form a match. Otherwise, if the criminals do not draw a probability from the gray region,
they would segregate by creating matches within their own groups, as in the right tail of the
distribution of the criminals from group m. This is when matching on observables will coincide
with matching on ability. Thus, with introducing diﬀerent demographic groups the prediction
of this model is that
p1m − p2n = 0 (2)
This pattern of matching is similar to the one tabulated in Table 3. There, pmales > pfemales.
The two groups match in the common area of when p ≈ 0.627. In the opposite tails of their
respective distributions of probability of success, they match along pfemales ≈ 0.42 on average
for females and pmales ≈ 0.64 on average for males.
However, matching choice could also be the result of preferences. If one group has an
advantage in reputation or is simply preferred to any other group, then its members would
have the bargaining power to choose partners from a diﬀerent demographic group with higher
probability of success than their own. To see this consider ﬁgure 2. On the horizontal axis
the probability of success for group m is depicted, while on the vertical axis is the probability
of success for group n. The 45 degree line shows the unbiased matches, with no frictions and
no bias. Consider ﬁrst the case of a positive bias. When a certain criminal with a probability
pm considers partners from the other group, if his bias is positive, he will accept matches with
13The argument does not depend on the distributional assumption and the productivity in each group could
be distributed diﬀerently.
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Figure 1: Distributions of groups of criminals
p3n pn p
1
m = p
2
n
pm
p
Figure 2: Frictionless Matching with Bias
pm
pn
Bias = 0
Bias > 0
Bias < 0
pm
pn < pm
pn = pm
pn > pm
Notes: On the vertical axis the probability of success of group n is depicted, and on the horizontal axis the
probability of success of group m. B denotes bias in matching, the 45 degree line denotes the equilibrium along
which matches are unbiased.
partners pn that have a lower probability of success. This match would be acceptable for the
other partner, because of the higher success probability of the choosing m criminal. Therefore,
in this case, p1m − p2n = Bias. In the second case, if the bias is negative, pm will demand a
higher probability of success in order to match up with criminals from the n group. These
matches would be rejected by criminals from group n who would prefer to match with someone
with higher probability of success. Thus, criminals would match within their own demographic
groups. In the third case, if there is two-sided bias compatibility, if the bias is negative and group
n has a positive (compensating) bias towards groupm, then criminals from the two groups would
match between one another. That is, criminals from group m do not like matching with n, but
criminals from group n like it. Therefore, group m would demand higher probability of success
from group n and group n would be glad to give it. In this case, matches between m and n
would be observed and:
p1m − p2n = Bias
3.3 Frictions
Clearly, the outcome of perfect positive assortative matching depends crucially on the assumption
that matching is frictionless. This strong assumption is likely not satisﬁed and one can easily note
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that as frictions increase the matching becomes more dependent on opportunity rather than on
planning. Shimer & Smith (2003) and Smith (2006) introduce frictions in the matching market
and show that, given the positive assortative matching incentive, the diﬀerence in probability
between the two partners would be close to zero in expectation:
E(p1m − p2n) = 0 (3)
There are several types of relevant matching frictions. First, partners might be impatient in
waiting for a good match and they would match with the ﬁrst arriving candidate. In segregated
neighbourhood this would imply matching within the own demographic group. However, the
data clearly shows that on average the jurisdictions of law-enforcement agencies are diverse with
respect to gender and race, with an average value of 0.4 (see Table 1) and both inter-gender and
inter-race partnerships exist(as in Table 2). Thus, matching with the ﬁrst arriving candidate
could be described by random matching. In the context of ﬁgure 1 this would imply that it
would be equally likely to observe a match between criminals with probabilities of success p1m
and p2n, as it would be to observe a match between criminals with probabilities of success p
1
m
and p3n. Thus, random matching implies that:
E(p1m − p2n) = pm − pn (4)
At the other extreme, criminals could be very patient and wait for their perfect match,
creating a pattern of matching similar to Equation 3.
A second friction could be that a criminal can choose partners only from a limited set, such
as a gang, maﬁa or marriage. Participation in such a group implies the repetitive playing of
the prisoner's dilemma, that is, the criminal that is arrested is expected to observe silence. In
this case, the incentive for positive assortative matching breaks down. It might be that in big
samples 4 would be valid, that is, within some groups some criminals will match positivelly,
negativelly and randomly. Jumping fast-forward on empirics, I try to capture this in two ways
in my robustness checks. First, repetitive outcomes would be captured by the agency-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, the data oﬀers the unique opportunity to control for gang membership.
A third friction is that the perspective of high earnings can make for unlikely bedfellows. In
this case, matching could follow any pattern, yet I conjecture it could not depend on observables.
The prospect of high earnings is similar to impatience, thus earning a pattern closer to random
matching. In a robustness check I show that accounting for this friction does not change the
results.
Fourth, imperfect information about the partner can lead to several outcomes. On one
hand, if there is no information, then matching would be as random, because no criminal has
information on possible partners. On the other hand, if there is full information, then matching
would be unbiased because each criminal could observe the other perfectly. Thus, the diﬀerence
in probability of success between the two partners would vary from random to zero. In a related
case, informational frictions, such as reputation, can underpin a discriminatory bias and produce
statistical discrimination - a bias that diminishes as the criminal ages and obtains information
about the probability of success of the opposite demographic group. This concern is addressed
in the robustness checks.
Therefore, in positive assortative matching with frictions in some cases one can expect a
diﬀerence in the probability of success between partners varying from zero to the diﬀerence
in average probability of success between the two demographic groups. Matching varies from
unbiased to random and in many cases does not imply that the diﬀerence in probability of
success between partners is correlated to the observable characteristics. While I have addressed
some of these frictions in the robustness checks, it is important to bear them as a potential
caveat to my results. The next section formally deﬁnes the empirical hypotheses and test for
identifying a bias.
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Hypothesis
The positive assortative matching pattern in the model from the previous section is based on
the assumption that criminals match endogenously on criminal ability characteristics, that are
unobservable to the econometrician. Once a match has been established and the crime commited,
both partners face the same probability of success, conditional on the crime incident. Taking the
diﬀerence between the two probabilities cancels out the incident speciﬁc eﬀect, which includes
distance from law-enforcement agents, number of policemen on patrol on the day of the crime,
crime characteristics and other characteristics of the partnership, as well as location speciﬁc
eﬀects14.
Under unbiased matching, the diﬀerence between the two success realizations should be zero
on average and not correlated with observables, that is, the correlation between the diﬀerence
in observable traits and the diﬀerence in observed probability of success should be zero. If β
is the regression coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence in observable traits with dependent variable the
diﬀerence in probability of success, then
H0 : β = 0
As already outlined in the previous section, if the matching environment is characterized by
frictions, then matching would not be positive assortative but close to random and exogenous.
In an extreme case each criminal matches with the ﬁrst partner he meets. In this setting,
the diﬀerence between two partners could be predicted by the demographic averages of their
group. For example, if black males have a higher success probability than white males, then if
one draws randomly criminals from each group, on average the black male would be of higher
criminal ability than the white one. Therefore, the matching choice is correlated with observable
characteristics and under the alternative:
H1 : sign(β) = sign(pm − pn > 0)
In the third scenario, the matching choice could be biased and driven by an observable
characteristic. Considering the sign of β, β > 0 could be due to both bias and frictions. But if
β < 0 < pm − pn then the negative bias eﬀect dominates the frictions in the market. Therefore,
the negative bias leads to productivity diﬀerences within the couple that run counter to the ones
between the two demographic groups,
H2 : β < 0 < pm − pn
4.2 Identiﬁcation
In order to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous subsection I estimate the speciﬁcation:
p1 − p2 = (X1 −X2)β + υ (5)
where the observed diﬀerence between success realizations p1 and p2 is a function of X1−X2,
the net diﬀerence in observable characteristics. X contains the variables for race, gender and
age with reference category black males. The dependent variable p1 − p2 can take the values
{−1, 0, 1}, depending on whether the ﬁrst partner was arrested (and the second succeeded),
both of them faced the same outcome, or, the second partner was arrested15. The coeﬃcient
β measures the correlation between the observed success diﬀerences between the 2 criminals in
14Location speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the robustness checks.
15For a treatment on the latent nature of the dependent variable and estimation see appendix.
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the couple and the diﬀerence in observable traits.16.
In the following empirical analysis a couple corresponds to one observation and not to two,
as is the case with dyadic data analysis, which is used to model the occurrence of an event
between 2 persons or countries. For example, in network theory the establishment of a link
between 2 entities (nodes) is modeled from the perspective of both entities. Here this is not
the case due to one concern: there is no variable denoting an interaction that diﬀers for the
2 nodes, so there would be issues with multicollinearity were I to use dyadic analysis in this
case. In this vein, it is important to note that law-enforcement agencies do not seem to follow a
speciﬁc pattern in recording the order of criminals in an incident and records are as if randomly
assigned. Nevertheless, I randomize their order17. Therefore, there is no statistical diﬀerence
between all criminals 1 and 2 in a couple18.
Ideally, one would want to have several observations over the same criminal pair in order to
pinpoint the ﬁne diﬀerence between pm and pn in a match. The lack of such detail in the data
is compensated by many observations, that can relate the systematic diﬀerences between match
partners to observable traits. Therefore, I identify aggregate βs for the demographic groups and
the identiﬁcation for the independent variables comes from observations in which only one of
two partners was arrested.
5 Results
The ﬁrst column in table 4 presents the baseline results from the estimation of equation 5. The
following columns show diverse robustness checks which will be discussed in the next section.
The coeﬃcient on white is negative, while the coeﬃcient on female is positive. The interpretation
of the coeﬃcients is discussed below. To show the signiﬁcance of the results, in table 5 they
are presented within the context of the group success means. The ﬁrst 2 columns show the
unconditional values of p1 and p2, in the sample19. The last two columns show the predicted
diﬀerences, following equation 5.
In male-female groups females have a higher probability of success. The coeﬃcient on female
is positive, and the independent variable is negative. In more detail, in a male-female couple
female1 = 0 and female2 = 1, where female1 and female2 are dummies for both partners
for female genders. Therefore, female= female1 − female2 = 0 − 1 = −1. The variable that
denotes the diﬀerence in demographic characteristics is female2, which enters the equation with
a negative sign. Thus, p1− p2 = β× (−1) < 0 showing that on average females are less likely to
get arrested when they are in a male-female group.
Consider the pair of a black male and a black female. For them the dependent variable
should be positive, because on average black males face a higher probability of success than black
females, as seen in table 5. Therefore, pblackmale − pblackfemale > 0 in such a match. However,
the coeﬃcient on female is positive meaning that ̂pblackmale − pblackfemale < 0. Therefore, on
average black females have lower probability of success than black males, but whenever they
form a cross-gender partnership they have a higher probability of success. A similar pattern can
be observed in the white male and female pair, where while white males have a higher likelihood
of success, in the observed matches they are of a lower criminal quality. Therefore, for matches
16Another way to measure this would be to estimate β1 on X1 and β2 on X2, where by construction β1 = −β2.
The symmetry is present when estimating as a robustness check a speciﬁcation with separate β's for the two
oﬀenders. The reason for which I estimate the coeﬃcient β on X1−X2 is because it provides directly a statistic,
comparable to the diﬀerence in success productivity between the groups deﬁned by X.
17I generate a uniform distribution for the ﬁrst criminals in each couple and reassign them to be second if their
realization is above the mean.
18I don't show a table with a test for the diﬀerence in means for the demographic variables because the
information in it would repeat the summary statistics.
19The success means remain the same when conditioning on agency origin, one of the spoils of large samples.
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between males and females the null hypothesis of unbiased matching is rejected, as well as the
alternative of random matching as a result of frictions.
However, the hypothesis of bias cannot be rejected. The observed patterns in male-female
matches are consistent with males having a negative taste for working with females and with
females having a positive bias for male criminals.
In a black-white couple whites are more likely to get arrested. The estimated coeﬃcient
on race white in table 4 is negative, meaning that in black-white couples blacks have a higher
probability of success. This is also consistent with success means in table 5. Therefore, I reject
the hypothesis of unbiased matching, but I cannot reject the alternative hypotheses of random
matching and positive (or negative) bias. Either white males form matches with the ﬁrst black
male they meet, and or black males have a positive bias for whites and or white males have a
negative bias against blacks.
With respect to age, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of unbiased matching. Criminal
success is increasing with respect to age and 25 year olds have a higher success mean than 18
year olds. Random matching would generate a positive coeﬃcient for old-young partnerships.
Given that the coeﬃcient is not diﬀerent from 0, I can reject the alternative hypothesis of random
matching and biased preferences.
In sum, I ﬁnd evidence of biased preferences in matches between males and females. Matches
between whites and black could be generated by biased preferences and market frictions. Matches
with respect to age seem to be as if generated from an unbiased matching environment. The
following section will assess the eﬀects of measurement errors and reporting biases, market
speciﬁc trends, size of the monetary criminal earnings, age eﬀects and other robustness checks.
6 Robustness checks
In this section I present robustness checks. First, in column 2 of table 4 I present estimates
with interacted ﬁxed eﬀects for month and reporting agency. These ﬁxed eﬀects would hold
constant market speciﬁc matching frictions like speciﬁc within gang matching. If for example in
one market whites always match with blacks and the matches have always the same systematic
outcome, then the ﬁxed eﬀects would cancel out this variation. Even though, these location
crime speciﬁc eﬀects are canceled out in the diﬀerencing of the successes between the 2 partners,
the diﬀerence itself might vary systematically across the jurisdiction of diﬀerent law-enforcement
agencies. In column 2 it is shown that results remain the same.
Second, measurement error for non-arrested couples could impact the estimates, because of
reporting bias towards the non-arrested. For example, maybe the non-arrested were not observed
as well as those who were arrested. In order to assess this issue, I exclude the non-arrested from
the sample and estimate again equation 5. Thus, the underlying sample consists of couples in
which both partners were arrested and couples in which only one of two partners was arrested.
The results are presented in column 3 of table 4. Coeﬃcients do not change in sign, but they
increase in absolute terms. This could be due to two reasons: either the measurement error
attenuates estimates, or, in this way I exclude the group of couples that face the same arrest
outcome and that were less likely to select one another on observable characteristics. This
robustness check also diagnoses the measurement error due to a speciﬁc reporting bias with
respect to black males. The average probability of success for black males could be lower than
recorded, because there could be less real black male criminals than the ones reported. In this
subsample the success means are ordered as black males having the largest success probability,
followed by white males, black females and white females20. Given that the success ordering is
the same as in table 5, also the results remain unchanged and robust to these speciﬁc biases.
In column 4 of table 4 I include the monetary return on a crime as a covariate. The size
of the stolen loot could imply impatient matching - if a given criminal target earns a high
20The exact numbers are pBlackMale = .165, pWhiteMale = .130, pBlackFemale = .115 and pWhiteFemale = .103
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enough monetary return for the able criminal, he would be ready to match randomly with the
ﬁrst arriving partner. Therefore, for high levels of stolen loots matching would be random. Or,
alternatively, for a high loot one would be more picky about his criminal partners. Also in this
case results remain unchanged.
In column 5 the sample is limited to partnerships whose members are older than 29 years.
These oﬀenders are more experienced, their disutility of arrest could be larger than the average
because of an extensive police ﬁle and the quality of the pairing should be better. There is a
persistent negative eﬀect for whites, but the eﬀect for females is close to 0. This implies that I
cannot reject the null hypothesis of unbiased assortative matching. If one is willing to assume
that the bias is discriminatory, then the results could imply that the bias for females is statistical
discrimination that diminishes as both partners age and learn about the quality of the other's
demographic group.
In column 6 the sample is limited to those crimes that were reported to have occurred in
daylight hours, between 8 and 19. This check minimizes the reporting bias due to the cloak of
the night. In these crimes at least one of the oﬀenders was arrested (thus, subsample of the
sample in column 3) and results are similar in magnitude to the ones in column 3.
One of the channels of relaxing search frictions in the crime market is to search for partners
within the own gang. In column 1 of table 6 I control for gang aﬃliation, which would ease the
formation of partnerships and it does not change results. The variable for gang is negative but
not signiﬁcant. The negative coeﬃcient shows that in matches of non-gang and gang members,
the gang ones are more likely to get arrested. This could be either due to inherent diﬀerences
between individual criminals and criminals from gangs, where the former are less likely to get
arrested, or, law-enforcement has an easier access to gangsters due to for example informants.
A robustness check on only gang members shows similar results (not included for brevity).
In column 2 I include the full choice set of races and results remain the same and none of
the additional variables show a signiﬁcant correlation to diﬀerences in success.
In column 3 I control for same oﬀense - both criminals have the same oﬀense code on their
incident record. If criminals are specialized and commit the same oﬀense they would be better
able to judge one another. Furthermore, if there is a male-speciﬁc intimidation eﬀect that
drives the results for the female bias, it would be reﬂected in the oﬀense code for the male and,
once this source of variation is canceled out, the coeﬃcient on female should reﬂect the average
productivity diﬀerences between the 2 groups and be negative. However, results remain the
same and are, therefore, not driven by crime role.
In order to partially disentangle learning from all reasons for matching, I restrict the sample
by the age diﬀerences between 2 oﬀenders. In column 4 of table 6 the sample is restricted to
only those pairs whose age diﬀerence within is less than 5 years21. The age variable shows a
signiﬁcant direction, hinting that older oﬀenders are less successful, while the coeﬃcient on race
is lower. This is consistent with the hypothesis for a bias for older partners, where they turn
out to have a lower criminal ability than the younger one. This age eﬀect could be also due
to strategic policing, especially when both oﬀenders are young and the older one is considered
to be the bad inﬂuence, or, because the older oﬀender is more likely to have a ﬁle with the
police. This eﬀect, albeit smaller, is also to be found in column 5 in table 4, where I considered
partnerships between older criminals.
In column 5 I exclude observations from a given agency-year in which the observed partner-
ships were only between blacks or between males. Such a criminal market would suﬀer from non
availability of other partners and the results remain the same, given that identiﬁcation comes
from the pairs with diﬀering observables. In column 6 I aggregate the agencies into cities and
control for city-month ﬁxed eﬀects. The results remain robust throughout all speciﬁcations.
In column 7 I present results where the underlying sample is composed of groups of 3. Each
21The choice of age gap is arbitrary, but representative of the results that the reader can ﬁnd in the appendix
for diﬀerent gaps.
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group is represented by 3 observations of 2 randomly assigned partners, consistent with the
intuition that each member has to match with each other member. The results are the same as
in a group of 2. This could be interpreted as that the same type of matching mechanisms that
governs the pairing up of 2 criminals could account for the formation of small criminal groups
and gangs.
Disaggregating the results by crime types in table 7 shows that the eﬀect for whites is
observed in shop-lifting. The eﬀect for females is driven by robberies and other larceny and
stolen property oﬀenses. The eﬀect for burglaries, motor vehicle theft, theft of parts and from
motor vehicles is not conclusive as females have a higher success probability than males in these
crimes. Surprisingly, there is barely an eﬀect for females in shoplifting, a crime traditionally
associated with their gender. This could be due to there being no negative bias for females,
consistent with their associated reputation, but it could be also due to matching frictions. The
coeﬃcient is close to zero, so it could imply also unbiased matching. Across crimes the age
variable changes sign. In shoplifting it is negative, so that in crime commited by a 17 year old
and a 18 year old, the older one is more likely to get arrested. Conversely, in an auto theft the
younger criminal is more likely to get arrested.
Further on, in the appendix one can ﬁnd robustness checks extending columns 4 and 5 from
table 6, estimation on samples selected by relative diversity of the underlying criminal population
and results from multinomial logit estimation of equation 5, as well as, separating the coeﬃcients
for the 2 criminals.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes partnerships among criminals and provides evidence for discriminatory bias
in matching between males and females. In the context of breaking the law, the practice of
the police oﬀering a bargain (or a dilemma) to the oﬀender that was ﬁrst apprehended in order
to catch his partner creates an incentive to choose as one's partner the best from all possible
candidates. Therefore, I model matching by assuming that the desired partner trait is a high
ability to escape law-enforcement. This incentive leads both partners to choose a successful
counterpart, thereby creating a pattern of positive assortative matching between criminals on
probability of success. Arrest realizations allow me to pinpoint matches in which criminal
productivity diﬀers. Whenever only one of two partners got arrested this might hint on there
being a diﬀerence with the criminal skills of the partners. If this diﬀerence is correlated with
observable characteristics this might be evidence for a discriminatory bias.
Therefore, I identify biases based on the endogenous decision with whom to match. Discrim-
ination is observed whenever one partner diﬀers from another in an observable characteristic and
faces a diﬀerent probability success. In the case of gender, whenever females form a partnership
with males they face a lower probability of arrest than males. Taking this together with the
observation that on average females face a higher probability of arrest than males, means that
in male-female matches females match down. This is consistent with females having a positive
taste or bias for males and males having a negative bias for females.
Similarly, blacks have a higher success average and when they form a partnership with whites
they still face a higher success probability. Given assortative matching, this is consistent with
matches forming in an environment with search frictions, where the selection of the partner is
close to random.
Additionally, I ﬁnd that the discriminating diﬀerences in productivity diminish for older
criminals hinting at the hypothesis of statistical discrimination between males and females. I ﬁnd
an additional discriminatory bias between peers of similar ages, where if a 20 year old criminal
forms a partnership with a 17 years old one, then he faces a higher likelihood of arrest. This
hints at a pattern where the younger one compensates for his age with a higher criminal ability.
Other robustness checks include limiting the analysis to criminal market with demographically
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diverse oﬀender pool and controlling for measurement errors by considering only couples where
at least one person was arrested or the crime was commited in broad daylight and controlling
for the size of the loot.
The novel empirical design conveys the essential message that considering positive assortative
matching as characterizing matches, and taking into account productivity diﬀerences between
demographic groups, one can refer systematic diﬀerences in criminal ability within a match to
biased preferences on observable traits or search frictions. The identiﬁcation comes from the
endogenous match formation, and by virtue of arrest revealing criminal ability. Conceptually
assortative matching and discrimination are linked through the signiﬁcance of observable traits
in the matching choice. When choosing a partner based solely on criminal ability, observables
should not predict signiﬁcantly the partner choice. When matching is based on an observable
trait, as in discrimination, then assortative matching on criminal ability fails. Essentially, my
empirical strategy determines whether matching is based on observables in the presence of
incentives to match on ability.
This paper links assortative matching with discrimination in a novel test for bias. It makes
a ﬁrst step in describing matching patterns in the illegal criminal market, linking the crime
literature with the literature on assortative matching and discrimination. The implication of
this paper are several. First, matching between whites and blacks is close to random and
persisting with age. This allows for an application in cell-mate assignment in prison, where cell-
mates could be of diﬀerent race colour. Second, this paper oﬀers a perspective into the creation
of cross-gender pairs in a formal relationship in an unregulated market. A similar market is the
one for academic article co-authors, where females could be better at producing articles than
males in a male-female co-authorship. In this market the relative productivity of females cannot
be teased out because the outcome is pair-speciﬁc and not individual-speciﬁc as in crime, which
spells out the advantage of my application in identifying a discriminatory bias.
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Table 4: Matching patterns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2
White -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Female 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(loot) -0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 1,087,371 1,087,371 504,750 990,956 221,935 657,168
R-squared 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Month*Agency FE - x - - - -
Sample Only
Restriction: . . Arrested Loot Age≥30 7<Hour<20
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors clustered at the reporting
agency level. The top of the column shows the dependent variable. Estimation through OLS, it includes
interacted year month and agency ﬁxed eﬀects where noted with x.
Table 5: Diﬀerences table
Unconditional success means Regression results
Type of Couple p1 p2 p̂1 − p2 Standard Error
Black Male-Black Male 0.708 0.708
Black Male-Black Female 0.708 0.513 -0.007*** 0.001
Black Male-White Male 0.708 0.590 0.005*** 0.001
Black Male-White Female 0.708 0.506 0.003* 0.001
Black Female-Black Female 0.510 0.513 0.000 0.000
Black Female-White Male 0.510 0.590 0.012*** 0.002
Black Female-White Female 0.510 0.506 0.005*** 0.001
White Male-White Male 0.591 0.590 0.000 0.000
White Male-White Female 0.591 0.506 -0.007*** 0.001
White Female-White Female 0.505 0.506 0.000 0.000
Notes: p1 and p2 denote the unconditional probabilities of success. ̂p1 − p2 denotes the diﬀerence in success
means as predicted by equation 5
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Table 6: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2
White -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Female 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gang 0.005
(0.003)
Indian Race -0.006
(0.005)
Asian Race -0.000
(0.005)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,087,371 1,107,681 915,811 756,106 973,307 1,087,359 720,372
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.169 0.329
Month*City x
Incident FE x
Sample Same Diversity Triple
Restriction: Oﬀense Age Gap<5 > 0 Matching
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors clustered at the
reporting agency level. The top of the column shows the dependent variable. Estimation through OLS, including
ﬁxed eﬀects where noted. In column 5 the sample includes agencies that are heterogeneous in at least one
dimension between gender and race. Column 6 includes interacted year month city ﬁxed eﬀects instead of
year-month-agency and errors are clustered at the city level. Column 7 present results on an underlying sample
of groups of 3, with group (incident) ﬁxed eﬀects and errors clustered at the agency level.
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Table 7: Results by Crime Type
UCR Code Crime White Female Age Constant Observations R-squared
200 Arson -0.017 (0.020) 0.021* (0.012) 0.001 (0.001) -0.006 (0.005) 5,270 0.001
23A Pocket-picking -0.006 (0.019) 0.007 (0.010) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.006) 2,074 0.001
23B Purse-snatching -0.006 (0.016) -0.014 (0.011) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.006) 3,344 0.001
23C Shoplifting -0.008*** (0.002) -0.003* (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 300,639 0.000
23D Theft from Building -0.007 (0.004) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 80,179 0.000
23E Theft from Coin-Operated Machine -0.087* (0.048) 0.046 (0.035) -0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.005) 2,988 0.010
23F Theft from/of Motor Vehicle -0.004 (0.006) 0.022*** (0.004) 0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 63,083 0.001
23G Parts -0.009 (0.011) 0.028*** (0.010) -0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.003) 14,123 0.001
23H All Other Larceny -0.005* (0.003) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.000*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 199,944 0.000
240 Motor Vehicle Theft 0.008 (0.007) 0.026*** (0.004) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.002) 53,662 0.002
220 Burglary -0.004 (0.003) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 169,941 0.001
120 Robbery -0.006* (0.003) 0.017*** (0.004) -0.001** (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 112,292 0.001
280 Stolen Property Oﬀenses 0.014 (0.010) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.003) 19,668 0.001
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A Speciﬁcation
In more detail, the regression speciﬁcation in the main text is:
p1 − p2 = α+ βw(W 1 −W 2) + βf (F 1 − F 2) + βa(A1 −A2) +  (6)
where 1 and 2 refer to the order of the criminals in the partnership. W is an indicator variable
for white skin colour, F is an indicator variable for the female gender. A is age, measured in
years. The outcome variable is latent: p1 − p2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, while it is deﬁned over the interval
[−1, 1]. This means that the error term is not normal, as it is assumed with OLS, but it has mass
around {−1, 0, 1}. Therefore, as a robustness check I estimate equation 6 with a multinomial
logit estimator.
The ﬁrst 2 columns of table A.1 repeat the results from table 4 from the main text. The ﬁrst
column shows the baseline results. The second and third columns show the estimation results
for a multinomial logit model with base outcome 0. The results are in line with the ones in
the ﬁrst 2 columns and the marginal eﬀect follow the pattern of the signs of the coeﬃcients in
OLS. For example the marginal eﬀect for white is positive (.0025) for the relative outcome of
p2 > p1 with respect to p2 = p1. Therefore, in the situation of the ﬁrst criminal becoming white
(very hypothetical), while the second is black, there is an increased likelihood that p2 > p1. The
last column presents results estimated with an ordered logit, that takes into account the latent
nature of the dependent variable. The results are similar to the ones provided with the previous
2 estimators.
The alternative speciﬁcation considered in this section is:
p1 − p2 = α+ β1wW 1 + β2wW 2 + β1fF 1 + β2fF 2 + β1aA1 + β2aA2 + 
where β1 = −β2 by construction. This symmetry condition is sensitive to the random order
of criminals within a couple. However, when taking several random orders and taking the
mean estimates, it seems that the mean estimate for white is 0.004 and for female 0.007, both
signiﬁcant. Table A.2 presents the results. The ﬁrst column shows estimates with no ﬁxed eﬀects
and column 2 shows that the point estimates do not change with the inclusion of location-year
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
Considering a black male and female couple, the dependent variable becomes negative, show-
ing that the probability of success of the female is higher than that of the male. Similarly, in a
male white and black couple the probability of success of the white criminal is lower than that
of the black. These results are in line with the results in the main text. The last 2 columns show
the estimation results for a multinomial logit model. They are in line with the results in the
previous column. For example the marginal eﬀect for the variable White 2 for a positive outcome
variable is positive (0.003). When the second person in the pair is white it is more likely that
the probability of success of the ﬁrst black male is bigger than the probability of success of the
second white male. The marginal eﬀect for the second criminal to be a female is -0.005. Only the
variable for age seems to show diﬀerent results than in the previous speciﬁcations, the marginal
eﬀect for age of both criminals is positive ( .00018 to .00022) for both relative outcomes.
B Evidence of Non-random Matching
A further evidence of bias or search frictions can be easily seen with the following reasoning.
Consider the probability of observing a pair of two diﬀerent types:
Pr(type1, type2) = Pr(type1)Pr(type2|type1)
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Table A.1: Multinomial Logit Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2
Outcome -1 1
White -0.005*** 0.032** -0.046*** -0.042***
(0.001) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
Female 0.007*** -0.068*** 0.057*** 0.066***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.000 -2.718*** -2.716***
(0.000) (0.023) (0.024)
Cut 1 -2.782***
(0.022)
Cut 2 2.780***
(0.022)
Observations 1,087,371 1,087,371 1,087,371 1,087,371
R-squared 0.000
Estimator OLS ML ML OL
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors clustered at the
reporting agency level. The top of the column shows the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column repeats the
results from table 4. The second and third columns show the results of a multinomial logit model estimation
with base outcome 0. The fourth column shows the results from an ordered logit estimation.
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Table A.2: Results with a Diﬀerent Speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3)
p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2
Outcome -1 1
Criminal 1:
White -0.004*** 0.036 -0.028
(0.001) (0.023) (0.024)
Female 0.006*** -0.109*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.026) (0.020)
Age -0.000 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Criminal 2:
White 0.005*** -0.029 0.064***
(0.001) (0.024) (0.022)
Female -0.008*** 0.025 -0.116***
(0.001) (0.021) (0.024)
Age 0.000 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.000 -2.937*** -2.936***
(0.001) (0.059) (0.057)
Observations 1,087,371 1,087,371 1,087,371
R-squared 0.000
Estimator OLS ML ML
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors clustered at the
reporting agency level. The top of the column shows the dependent variable. The ﬁrst column matches the
results from table 4. The second and third columns show the results of a multinomial logit model estimation
with base outcome 0.
25
Figure 3: Bias against Matching with Males
Note: This ﬁgure plots the gap Pr(female,male) − Pr(female) × Pr(male). Whenever the gap diﬀers from 0
this is an evidence of a bias in matching. The conﬁdence intervals are constructed through 1000 bootstrap draws
of 10 000 observations each. The probabilities are averaged over the reporting agency. The larger conﬁdence
intervals at the beginning of the sample may reﬂect the ongoing collection eﬀort of NIBRS, as the observations
in 1995 are less than in 2011.
where type can be either gender or race and the subscripts refers to the 2 possible realizations. If
2 partners match up randomly, then Pr(type2|type1) = Pr(type2). The probability of ending up
with a female partner would be independent from the own gender, or in other words, the uncondi-
tional probability would be equal to the probability, conditional on the type of the other criminal.
Pr(female,male) < Pr(female)Pr(male), indicating that Pr(female|male) < Pr(female)
and thus the choice for a female with whom to form a match is not independent of own type. The
same pattern can be observed also in the dimension of race, showing that matching is far from
random. In both ﬁgures, correlational evidence shows that criminals do not form partnerships
randomly with respect to observable characteristics.
C Further Robustness Checks
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Figure 4: Bias against Matching with Blacks
Note: This ﬁgure plots the diﬀerence Pr(white, black)−Pr(white)×Pr(black). Whenever the gap diﬀers from 0
this is an evidence of a bias in matching. The conﬁdence intervals are constructed through 1000 bootstrap draws
of 10 000 observations each. The probabilities are averaged over the reporting agency. The larger conﬁdence
intervals at the beginning of the sample may reﬂect the ongoing collection eﬀort of NIBRS, as the observations
in 1995 are less than in 2011.
Table C.1: Varying Market Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2
White -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.006**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Female 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Age -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 753,796 543,685 271,639 108,713 543,664
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Diversity >0 >percentile 50 >p75 >p90 <p50
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors clustered at the
reporting agency level. The top of the column shows the dependent variable.
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Table C.2: Varying Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2 p1 − p2
White -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Female 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 756,106 698,101 616,360 495,573 301,773 1,087,371
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sample Restriction: Age Gap<5 4 3 2 1 Age Dummies
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors clustered at the
reporting agency level. The top of the column shows the dependent variable.
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